Does Altruism Mitigate Free-riding and Welfare Loss? by Akram Temimi




A warm−glow motivation for charitable giving has recently been explored as a possible
solution to the problem of inefficient private provision of public goods. However, the
introduction of warm−glow affects both the efficient level of public good provision as well as
the equilibrium level. Hence it is not clear whether warm−glow mitigates or exacerbates
inefficiency. We revisit Andreoni's (1989) model of impure altruism and formally analyze
this question. Cornes and Sandler's (1986) index of easy riding and a version of Debreu's
(1951) coefficient of resource utilization are used as measures of free−riding and welfare
loss.
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The impure public good model is gaining widespread acceptance as a powerful framework for
analyzing charitable giving. Impure public good models are characterized by the presence of a
commodity which jointly generates both private and public beneﬁts (Cornes and Sandler (1984,
1986), Andreoni (1989, 1990), among others). That is, a person who makes voluntary contributions
to the provision of a public good may beneﬁt both from the act of contribution per se and from the
total supply of the public good. In such models, individuals may not be solely motivated by pure
altruism where they care only about the total amount of charitable giving. Individuals may also
be motivated by the “warm-glow” of having contributed. The combination of both motivations is
referred to as impure altruism.
Cornes and Sandler (1994) indicate that the privatization of beneﬁts may “attenuate” free-
riding motives. This great hope for warm-glow is also suggested by Olson (1965), Sugden (1984,
1986), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988), and Andreoni (1989, 1990), and is motivated by the idea
that the propensity to contribute to public goods is greater when agents also care about their
donations per se.M o r e s p e c i ﬁcally, the existing literature shows that the equilibrium level of
charitable contributions in most of these impure public good models is higher than in pure public
good models.
The importance of higher overall contributions, however, is only important to the extent that
it makes people better oﬀ. Cornes and Sandler (2000) point out that “policies that can increase
public good supply and improve everyone’s well-being have desirable normative properties, and,
as such, are more interesting than policies that just augment public good provision.” Indeed since
the introduction of warm-glow to preferences aﬀects both the equilibrium level and the eﬃcient
l e v e lo fp u b l i cg o o d sp r o v i s i o n ,i ti sn o tc l e a rap r i o r iwhether warm-glow mitigates or exacerbates
ineﬃciency and free-riding even if it leads to an increase in equilibrium contributions. This point
has not been addressed in the literature, which has focused exclusively on the equilibrium level of
provision.
In this paper we use Andreoni’s (1989) index of altruism and analyze the eﬀect of impure
altruism on the eﬃciency of private provision of public goods. We use two alternative measures
of eﬃciency. First we consider Cornes and Sandler’s (1984) proposed index of free-riding, derived
by pairing an equilibrium level of public goods with the eﬃcient level arising from a given income
distribution. Second, we consider a measure of welfare loss based on the coeﬃcient of resource
utilization introduced in the classic work of Debreu (1951). Using these two measures, we show
via an example that the degree of altruism has an ambiguous eﬀect on free-riding and welfare loss.
These results challenge our expectations that “warm-glow” may solve the problem of ineﬃcient
private provision of public goods.
2. An Impure Public Good Model
Following Andreoni (1989, 1990), we consider an economy with n identical consumers who
have preferences over a private good, a public good, and the individual’s contribution to the public
good. That is, the twice-diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave utility function of
1the representative agent is given by
Ui = U(xi,G,g i), (1)
where xi is the level of the private good, G i st h ea g g r e g a t el e v e lo ft h ep u b l i cg o o d ,a n dgi is the
agent’s contribution to the public good. The price of the private good is normalized to be one,
and the technology for transforming the private good into the public good is linear. Hence we can




gj = G−i + gi, (2)
and the representative agent’s budget constraint is given by
I = xi + gi (3)
where I is the individual’s endowment of the private good. The representative agent chooses xi, G,
and gi to maximize (1) subject to the constraints given by (2) and (3). Substituting in the budget




U(I + G−i − G, G, G − G−i), (4)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem implicitly deﬁne the demand for the public good as a
function of the exogenous components of (4),
G = fi(I + G−i,G −i). (5)
We can then directly express the representative agent’s demand for contributions as
gi = fi(I + G−i,G −i) − G−i. (6)
Note that the ﬁrst argument of fi comes directly from the public good argument of the utility
function and the second argument comes directly from the private contributions argument of the
utility function.
We can therefore consider the marginal propensity to donate for altruistic reasons and the













That is, an agent’s index of altruism is the proportion of his total propensity to contribute to the
public good explained by altruistic motives. In particular, if αj > αi then agent j can be considered
2to be more altruistic than agent i because his propensity to contribute to public goods is driven
less by the “warm-glow” from contributions than from the beneﬁts of consuming the public good.
Recall that in the impure altruism model presented here, all agents are identical. In this case,
we can say that the economy’s altruism index is simply the altruism index of the representative
consumer.
3. Equilibrium and Optimality
A standard result in the impure public good literature is that the Nash equilibrium level of
contributions will be suboptimal. In this paper, we analyze how an economy’s altruism index
relates to its “degree of ineﬃciency”. To do this, we consider measures of free-riding and welfare
loss. Cornes and Sandler (1986) suggest measuring the degree of free-riding by the ratio λ =
GEQ
GOPT
where GEQ is the equilibrium level of the public good and GOPT is the point on the Pareto frontier
at which each individual’s share of total contributions is the same as his equilibrium contribution
shares. Since we are considering symmetric equilibria, the equilibrium and optimal shares of
contributions are simply 1/n.S o GOPT is the point on the Pareto frontier which arises from an
equal distribution of initial wealth.
Arguably, however, the importance of free-riding by itself is only important to the extent that
it is evidence of welfare loss. Cornes and Sandler again point out that “equilibrium may be very
close to the optimum, yet be associated with a large welfare loss. Conversely, a substantial shortfall
of [equilibrium] below [optimality] may turn out not to matter much in welfare terms.”1 For this
reason, we also compare equilibrium contributions to optimal contribution levels by considering
a special case of Debreu’s (1951) coeﬃcient of resource utilization in which “the ineﬃciency is
now described by the number of dollars representing the value of the physical resources which
could be thrown away without preventing the achievement of the prescribed levels of satisfaction.”
Equivalently, we consider the degree to which we could scale back initial wealth and not prevent
the achievement of the equilibrium level of utility. That is, if gI
EQ and gI
OPT are the equilibrium
and optimal levels of the representative agent’s contributions as a function of initial wealth, and
gγI








If γ = 1 then there is no welfare loss at equilibrium. If γ = 0, then welfare loss is maximized. As
γ increases, welfare loss decreases.
4. The Eﬀect of Altruism on Free-riding and Welfare Loss
Consider an economy of n ≥ 2 consumers, each with the following utility function
U(xi,G,g i)=alnxi + blnG + clngi. (7)
1 Although the free-riding index doesn’t given us direct information about the size of welfare losses, one might expect
that a larger λ is associated with a smaller welfare losses. In fact, this is not always the case and is a partial
justiﬁcation for considering free-riding and welfare loss.
3This speciﬁcation is ubiquitous in the voluntary contribution literature. See Feldstein and Clot-
felter (1976), Abrams and Schmitz (1984), Shiff (1985), Lucas and Stark (1985), Cox (1987), and
Andreoni (1988, 1990).
4.1 The Equilibrium Level of Contributions
The representative consumer maximizes utility given by (7) subject to the constraints given by (2)







which equates the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private goods to the
marginal rate of transformation between the public good and private goods. Substituting in the
constraints given by (2) and (3), the ﬁrst order conditions can be re-written in terms of G and
G−i:
b(I + G−i − G)(G − G−i) − aG(G − G−i)+cG(I + G−i − G)=0 . (8)
The G that satisﬁes (8) gives the individual’s demand for the public good
G = fi(I + G−i,G −i)
as described by (5). In the symmetric equilibrium we know that G − G−i = G/n,s ow ec a nﬁnd







4.2 The Eﬃcient Level of Contributions
The eﬃcient level of public goods is determined by a modiﬁed Samuelson condition, the sum of
the marginal rates of substitution (between the public good and net private good) is equal to one.





Using the fact that we are concerned only with the symmetric optimum, substitute xi = I − G/n




a + b + c
. (10)
4.3 The Altruism Index
Using (8) and then substituting in the equilibrium level of contributions given by (9), the agent’s








n)2 +2 c b
n + c(a + c)
. (11)
4Let α be the altruism index of the representative agent in an economy, E,c o m p r i s e do fn consumers
with utility function U(xi,G,g i)=alnxi + blnG + clngi and initial endowment I. Similarly, let
ˆ α be the altruism index of the representative agent in an economy, ˆ E,c o m p r i s e do fn consumers
with utility function U(xi,G,g i)=ˆ alnxi +ˆ blnG +ˆ clngi and initial endowment I. Then, using
Andreoni’s language, economy E has a higher index of altruism than economy ˆ E if α > ˆ α.
Recall that our goal is to determine the relationship between an economy’s index of altruism
and the degrees of free-riding and welfare loss. To do this, we ﬁrst analyze how the intensity of
preference over G and gi is related to the altruism index.
Proposition 1. In economies E and ˆ E, if the preference for the private good is the same (a =ˆ a),
and the preference for warm glow is the same (c =ˆ c), then economy E has a higher index of
altruism than economy ˆ E i ft h ep r e f e r e n c ef o rt h ep u b l i cg o o di sh i g h e ri ne c o n o m yE( b>ˆ b).







n)2 +2 c b
n + c(a + c)]2 > 0. (12)
Proposition 2. In economies E and ˆ E, if the preference for the private good is the same (a =ˆ a),
and the preference for the public good is the same (b = ˆ b), then economy E has a higher index
of altruism than economy ˆ E if the preference for warm glow is suﬃciently high and is higher in
economy E (c>ˆ c> b
n).





n + c)( b
n − c)n2
[( b
n)2 +2 c b
n + c(a + c)]2. (13)
Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that, all other things equal, an economy with a larger b or a larger
c (provided c> b
n) has a larger altruism index.
4.4 Free-riding and Welfare Loss
Now we ﬁnd the degree of free-riding, λ, and welfare loss, γ, for this economy. It follows from (9)
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. (14)




















































We now present our main results. Recall from proposition 1 and 2 that a higher index of altruism
can be induced by either a greater preference for the public good or by warmer glow. Proposition 1
implies that, all other things equal between two economies, the economy with the greater intensity
of preference for the public good has a higher index of altruism. Now we determine whether such
an economy necessarily has more free-riding and greater welfare loss.
Proposition 3. In economies E and ˆ E where a =ˆ a and c =ˆ c,i fE has a higher index of altruism
than ˆ E (i.e., if b>ˆ b), then E may have more or less free-riding and welfare loss than ˆ E.
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db may not have the same sign. So, for example, the degree of free-riding may
be larger while the welfare loss is smaller.
Now recall from Proposition 2 that, all other things equal between two economies, the economy
with the greater warm-glow has a higher index of altruism (provided the warm-glow is strong
enough). Now we determine whether an economy being more altruistic in this manner implies that
is has less free-riding and smaller welfare loss.
Proposition 4. In economies E and ˆ E where a =ˆ a and b = ˆ b,i fE has a higher index of altruism
than ˆ E (i.e., if c>ˆ c> b
n), then E will have less free-riding but may have bigger or smaller welfare
loss than ˆ E.
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Propositions 3 and 4 combine to answer the title question of this paper – does altruism mitigate
free-riding and welfare loss? Our analysis shows that the answer is ambiguous in general. Even
6in this highly stylized model, economies that are more altruistic may or may not have more free-
riding and greater welfare loss. We also learn that the answer depends on how an economy is
more altruistic. The one unambiguous eﬀect derives from Proposition 4: if one economy is more
altruistic than another due to having a larger warm-glow eﬀect, then the more altruistic economy
will have a smaller degree of free-riding. This result perhaps conﬁrms the expectation that the
“privatization” of beneﬁts may solve the problem of ineﬃcient private provision of public goods.
However, although the more altruistic economy (due to more warm-glow) has less free-riding, it
m a yh a v eg r e a t e rw e l f a r el o s s .
5. Concluding Remarks
The literature on private provision of public goods indicates that in the presence of warm-
glow, equilibrium contributions are higher than in pure public good models. The importance of
higher overall contributions, however, is only important to the extent that it makes people better
oﬀ. This point has been completely ignored in the literature. The focus has been exclusively on
the equilibrium level of contributions. Our analysis shows via an example that a higher index of
altruism may be associated with more or less free-riding and welfare loss.
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